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WHEN ANIMUS MATTERS AND SEX CRIME
UNDERREPORTING DOES NOT: THE PROBLEMATIC
SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY
Ira Mark Ellman *

In Romer v. Evans the Court drew a constitutional distinction between civil
laws enacted for a broad public purpose that justifies “the incidental
disadvantages they impose on certain persons,” and laws that have “the
peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a
single named group”.1 Laws of the second kind “raise the inevitable
inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class
of persons affected.”2 The difficulty lies in deciding when the inference
properly becomes a conclusion that the law violates the Equal Protection
Clause. The more sweeping and unusual the burdens imposed on the targeted
group, the more difficult it may be to discern a common policy explaining
them other than the forbidden purpose of harming their targets. At some point
the animus inference becomes strong enough to require scrutiny of the laws’
purported rationale, including whether it has any actual basis in fact. An
astonishingly broad array of burdens are imposed today on anyone ever
convicted of almost any sexual offense of any kind or seriousness, including
but extending far beyond inclusion in publicized websites listing “sex
offenders.” No similar regime has ever been imposed on any other group of
law-abiding former felons who have fully served the sentence for the crime
*
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Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632, 635 (1996).
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they committed years earlier. This “registry regime” raises an inference of
animus at least as strong as in any of the four cases in which the Court
sustained such claims, and the explanation that the laws are justified by the
clearly valid purpose of reducing the incidence of sexual offending does not
survive the scrutiny of scientific studies which find the registry ineffective and
often counterproductive. Nor does the fact that many sexual offenses are
never reported to law enforcement authorities cast doubt on the validity of
those studies or on the legal or policy analyses that employ them. Much of
the registry regime must therefore fall under an Anti-Animus principle.
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INTRODUCTION
For the past three decades public policies aimed at suppressing
criminal sexual conduct have focused particularly on preventing re-offending
by those released from custody after having already been convicted and
punished for a sexual offense.3 Its central feature is the sex offender registry.
The registration requirement applies to a broad range of offenses: rape, of
course, but also non-penetrative sexual contact in various forms, including
unconsented touchings, a host of non-contact offenses (such as voyeurism,
indecent exposure, and possession of sexualized pictures of minors) and
sometimes nonsexual offenses that a court concludes were committed with a
3

Allegra M. McLeod, Regulating Sexual Harm: Strangers, Intimates, and Social
Institutional Reform, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1553, 1554-55 (2014).
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sexual motive.4 All states, encouraged by federal law, require those
convicted of the covered offenses to register in person at least annually but
as often as monthly.5 In some states the registration obligation continues for
life; in other states it may end after ten or 20 years, but only for some
registrants.6 As of December, 2018, there were nearly a million Americans
covered by the registration system.7 As detailed below in Part I, the
registration requirement generally triggers other consequences imposing
serious burdens on those reached by it, including restrictions on where they
may live, go, or work.

4

Alissa R. Ackerman, Andrew J. Harris, Jill S. Levenson & Kristen Zgoba, Who Are the
People in Your Neighborhood? A Descriptive Analysis of Individuals on Public Sex Offender
Registries, 34 INT. J. L. PSYCHIATRY 149, 156 (2011); Andrew J. Harris, Jill S. Levenson &
Alissa R. Ackerman, Registered Sex Offenders in the United States: Behind the Numbers, 60
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 3, 28 (2014).
5
Federal law requires registrants to appear in person to confirm the continued accuracy of
registration information annually, semi-annually, or quarterly, depending on the offense
triggering the registration obligation. 34 U.S.C. § 20918. Homeless registrants may be
required to reregister much more often. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.011 (2011),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=PEN&sectio
nNum=290.011 [perma.cc/GYY8-9E7H] (requiring “transients” to reregister every 30 days).
Registration obligations arise from a combination of federal and state laws. Federal law
requires states to enact sex offender registration laws that meet specified minimum federal
standards to avoid penalties in federal funding for law enforcement activities, but most states
have chosen to adopt non-compliant registry laws, either to save money or because they do
not agree with the required federal policy. LISA N. SACCO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43954,
FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION: OVERVIEW
AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, IN BRIEF 6; Jennifer N. Wang, Paying the Piper: The Cost of
Compliance with the Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 59 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 681, 694-95 (2014). Federal law also imposes registration requirements directly on
registrants but provides no federal registration system. Compliance therefore requires
registration in the relevant state, which can present difficulties for registrants when federal
rules require registrations that their state law does not. See, e.g., Willman v. United States,
972 F.3d 819, 823 (6th Cir. 2020) (concluding that a sex offender's obligations under federal
law are independent of duties under state law); Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. Doe,
94 A.3d 791, 802 (Md. 2014) (addressing whether Maryland may remove sex offender
registration information from its registry when there is a federal obligation to register in one's
home state).
6
See 50-State Chart on Relief from Sex Offender Registration, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
RES. CTR., https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/50-state-comparison-relief
-from-sex-offender-registration-obligations/ [perma.cc/35XM-59WV] (last updated June
2019) (documenting pervasive use of different lengths of time for required registration
depending on offense or recidivist status).
7
NAT'L CTR FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN, REGISTERED SEX OFFENDERS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND ITS TERRITORIES PER 100,000 POPULATION (2018), https://web.
archive.org/web/20190301234132/http:/www.missingkids.org/content/dam/pdfs/SOR%20
Map%20with%20Explanation_10_2018.pdf [perma.cc/JJA8-QS5E].
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Most of those additional burdens did not yet exist (or were not part of
the record) when Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) rejected a claim that Alaska
violated the Constitution’s ex post facto clause by applying its newly enacted
registry law to those convicted before its enactment. The Court concluded the
ex post facto clause did not apply because the registry was a civil regulation
reasonably designed to reduce sexual offending in light of the “frightening
and high” re-offense rates of those convicted of sexual crimes. The Court’s
dramatic but erroneous characterization of this re-offense risk reverberated
through the cases that followed over the next decade, underpinning a series
of decisions in state and federal courts turning back constitutional objections
to the registry.8 But later, and especially after social science scholarship
increasingly established both the Court’s error, and the very limited or
nonexistent contribution to public safety provided by the registry and the
additional restrictions triggered by it (the “registry regime”), the tide began
to turn. Several state and federal courts concluded that at least parts of the
registry regime do constitute punishment, thus barring their retroactive
application. These decisions have typically relied in part on social science
evidence that the registry regime does not advance public safety, leading to
the conclusion that it therefore serves no non-punitive purpose and therefore
constitutes punishment.9
Part I of this article capsules the harsh and sweeping nature of the
restrictions the registry regime imposes on people who have already fully
served the criminal sentence imposed on them for their offense, and shows
why, under a line of cases that stretch from Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) to United States v Windsor, 570 U.S. 744
(2013), they give rise to the inference they are based on unconstitutional
animus toward those affected by them and are therefore barred as civil
regulations if that inference cannot be overcome. Part II reviews the social
science that shows why the existing registry regime does not in fact further
the important policy purpose (public safety) offered to justify it, leading to
the conclusion that the inference of animus cannot be overcome. Finally, Part
III examines a recent reply to that social science evidence advanced by two
scholars and a distinguished judge, that the studies are flawed because they
rely on official crime statistics which necessarily omit the large proportion of
sexual offenses that are not reported to law enforcement authorities.10 It
8

Ira Mark Ellman & Tara Ellman, “Frightening and High”: The Supreme Court’s Crucial
Mistake About Sex Crime Statistics, 30 CONST. COMMENTARY 495, 497 (2015).
9
See cases cited infra notes 44 and 45.
10
See Nicholas Scurich & Richard S. John, The Dark Figure of Sexual Recidivism, 37
BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 158, 160 (2019) (arguing that it should not be assumed that released
sexual offenders did not commit new sexual offenses just because they were not charged);
Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 933 (7th Cir. 2016) (arguing that arrest rates are not
necessarily linked to the rate of occurrence for underlying offenses because sexual offenses
are systematically underreported).
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shows that their argument is grounded on a mistaken understanding of the
policy question put by the challenge to the registry regime, as well as of the
social science evidence its challengers rely upon. It shows why, when the
policy question and the social science evidence are properly understood, the
case against the registry regime is almost certainly strengthened, not
weakened, by the underreporting phenomenon.
I. THE NATURE AND HISTORY OF REGISTRY REGIME GIVES RISE TO THE
INFERENCE THAT IT IS BASED ON UNCONSTITUTIONAL ANIMUS
Registration, or conviction for a registrable offense, triggers a host of
additional consequences. Most registrants are publicly identified as “sex
offenders” on official state websites, which are in turn linked to a national
system maintained by the federal government intended to allow national
searches by anyone.11 These public listings may include the registrants’
address and place of employment.12 State and local laws often restrict where
registrants may live,13 frequently resulting in their becoming homeless14 and
even causing their forced evictions from nursing homes or hospices.15 In
some states registrants who have completed their sentence may nonetheless
be kept in prison because they cannot find a place to live that complies with
the state’s residency restrictions.16 They may be forced to move on 30 days’
notice, requiring their children to change schools mid-year, because a new
park or child care facility opened that is closer to their home than the
minimum distance specified by statute.17 Separate presence restrictions limit
where they may go, with the result that a registrant may be unable to enter a
11

WAYNE LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER: CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY
NOTIFICATION LAWS IN AMERICA 55-62 (2009).
12
Id. at 63-64.
13
Joanne Savage & Casey Windsor, Sex Offender Residence Restrictions and Sex Crimes
Against Children: A Comprehensive Review, 43 AGGRESS. VIOLENT BEHAV. 13, 13–15
(2018).
14
Deanna Cann & Deena Scott, Sex Offender Residence Restrictions and Homelessness: A
Critical Look at South Carolina, 31 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 1119, 1120-23 (2020); Savage
and Windsor, supra note 14, at 15; Valerie Schneider, The Prison to Homelessness Pipeline:
Criminal Record Checks, Race, and Disparate Impact, 93 IND. L. J. 421, 433 (2018).
15
Izzy Kapnick, Sex Offender Fights Removal From Hospice, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV.
(Sep. 9, 2016), https://www.courthousenews.com/sex-offender-fights-removal-from-hos
pice/ [perma.cc/XG78-DYFP].
16
Johnson v. Superintendent, 163 N.E.3d 1041, 1045 (N.Y. 2020); Allison Frankel, Pushed
Out and Locked In: The Catch-22 for New York’s Disabled, Homeless, Sex-Offender
Registrants, 129 YALE L.J.F. 279, 280 (2019).
17
Vasquez v. Foxx, 895 F.3d 515, 517 (7th Cir. 2018); Vasquez v. Foxx: Seventh Circuit
Holds Sex Offender Residency Restriction Does Not Violate Ex Post Facto Clause, 132
HARV. L. REV. 2352, 2353 (2019). The plaintiff’s claim that the forced move would disrupt
his daughter’s schooling did not avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim on any of the
constitutional grounds alleged. Id.
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public school to meet his child’s teacher or watch his child’s performance in
a play or athletic event. Indeed, in some states a registrant can commit a crime
by entering a public park to fetch his own child.18 State laws bar registrants
from a broad range of occupations, including haircutting, plumbing, selling
hearing aids, land surveying, and working in a dialysis facility.19 Federal law
bars registrants from housing programs permanently.20 Their access to
computers or smartphones are limited or barred altogether for years after their
release, and sometimes indefinitely,21 which further burdens their ability to
find employment or maintain social connections.
When a registrant in one state travels to another state, he must register
in that state—within a time period that varies from state to state and is often
short enough that weekend visits can trigger the registration obligation.22
Simple vacation trips, or even commutes across state lines, can thus become
traps for the unwary who inadvertently commit registration offenses that
carry the potential for significant prison sentences. Some states routinely
require registrants to wear ankle bracelets enabling round-the-clock location
monitoring, sometimes for life.23 Others require the driver’s license of

18

People v. Legoo, No. 124965, 2020 Ill. LEXIS 543, at *2, *13 (2020); see also Jacob
Sullum, Two Federal Courts Call BS on Banning Sex Offenders From 'Child Safety Zones',
REASON (2016), https://reason.com/2016/12/05/two-federal-courts-call-bs-on-banning-se/
[perma.cc/Y6XE-Y5NW] (stating that a North Carolina sex offenders list prevented five
offenders from accessing various public spaces and activities).
19
Tracy Jan, After Prison, a Lifetime of Economic Punishment, WASH. POST, (Sep. 3, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/business/jobs-after-prison-rhode-islandrecently-occupational-licensing/ [perma.cc/W668-RGWL]; Matt Mellema, Not Wanted: Sex
Offenders, SLATE, (August 14, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/ news_and_politics/
jurisprudence/2014/08/several_states_ban_people_in_the_sex_offender_registry_from_a_b
izarre_list.html [perma.cc/DNQ4-LBF8].
20
42 U.S.C. § 1366; 24 C.F.R. § 5.856 (2018); 24 C.F.R § 960.204(a)(4) (2018); 24 CFR §
982.553(a)(2) (2018). See also Corinne A. Carey, No Second Chance: People with Criminal
Records Denied Access to Public Housing, 36 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 545, 562 (2005)
(explaining that Congress mandates public housing authorities to reject applicants who are
subject to state sex offender registration laws). See generally David Thacher, The Rise of
Criminal Background Screening in Rental Housing, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 5, 7, 12–13,
23 (2008) (arguing that criminal history, including being on the sex offenders registry, play
a role in preventing prior offenders from accessing rental housing).
21
Jacob Hutt, Offline: Challenging Internet and Social Media Bans for Individuals on
Supervision for Sex Offenses, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 663, 664-65 (2019).
22
Shawn M. Rolfe, When a Sex Offender Comes to Visit: A National Assessment of Travel
Restrictions, 30 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 885, 891-96 (2019).
23
See Commonwealth v. Feliz, 119 N.E.3d 700, 705 (Mass. 2018) (noting that “[m]ore than
3,900 individuals in the Commonwealth, on probation, pretrial release, and parole, are
subject to court-ordered GPS monitoring,” some of them pursuant to a law requiring judges
to impose monitoring for individuals convicted of sex offenses); H.R. v. New Jersey State
Parole Bd., 213 A.3d 617, 619 (N.J. 2020) (describing a state law requiring high-risk sex
offenders to submit to GPS monitoring).
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registrants to contain a stamp identifying them as sex offenders.24 The
passport of any registrant convicted of an offense involving a minor
(including non-contact offenses such as viewing explicit pictures of anyone
under eighteen) must contain a notation identifying him as a sex offender,
part of a broader federal program to restrict the international travel of all
registrants.25 Because registrants are denied the right given other citizens to
obtain permanent residency status for their family members, their spouses
and children who are foreign nationals cannot remain in the United States.26
One common result is forced separation when registrants cannot follow their
evicted family to their foreign home because of the other laws restricting
registrants’ international travel.27
These examples of burdens imposed by law are predictably
supplemented by private actions triggered by the identification of registrants
on publicized websites as “sex offenders.”28 As noted by the Alaska Supreme
Court, “[i]nternet publication of sex offender registration information
potentially inflicts grievous harms on sex offenders ranging from public scorn
and ostracism to harassment, to difficulty in finding and maintaining

24

Carney v. Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 875 F.3d 1347, 1350 (10th Cir. 2017); Doe v.
Marshall, No. 2:15-CV-606-WKW [WO], 2018 WL 1321034, at *5 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 14,
2018).
25
In addition to the passport stamps, the same laws establish the “Angel Watch” program
under which the State Department notifies the destination countries of any planned
international travel by any registrants, no matter their offense. The interlocking statutory
provisions that combine to produce these results, part of the International Megan’s Law, Pub.
L. No. 114-119, § 8, 130 Stat. 24 (2016), are codified in various locations as described in
Daniel Cull, International Megan’s Law and the Identifier Provision—An Efficacy Analysis,
17 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 181, 185 (2018). See also Jacob Sullum, Scarlet-Letter
Passports Are Unjust and Irrational, REASON.COM, (Nov. 11, 2017), https://reason.com
/2017/11/01/scarlet-letter-passports-are-unjust-and/ [perma.cc/2ABW-DU3R] (describing
the unjust and irrational system of restricting international travel for people on the sex
offender registry).
26
The Adam Walsh Act precludes citizens from petitioning for immediate relative status if
they were convicted of a “specified offense against a minor. ” 8 USC § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I).
An offense against a minor is broadly defined to include “[a]ny conduct that by its nature is
a sex offense against a minor.” 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7)(I).
27
Many countries outside of continental Europe refuse admission to anyone with a sex
offender passport stamp or when the U.S. has notified the country of the traveler’s sex
offense conviction under the Angel Watch program. Registrant International Travel Matrix,
REGISTRANT TRAVEL ACTION GROUP , http://registranttag.org/resources/travel-matrix/
[perma.cc/NQ63-L5R9] (last updated Aug. 2021). For accounts of registrants forced to
separate from their families because of these laws, see True Stories, WELCOME TO
FIGHTAWA, https://fightawa.org/awatruestories/ [perma.cc/PK6Q-CYVC] (last updated
Feb. 4, 2021) (showcasing stories of families separated because of the Adam Walsh Act).
28
LOGAN, supra note 12, at 64.
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employment, to threats of violence and actual violence.”29 Their spouses and
children are often ostracized.30 Their families are more likely to disintegrate,
denying sex offenders the support important to rehabilitation. Those who try
to help them may become targets themselves.31 Indeed, programs to help
released offenders re-integrate into society often exclude those with a sexual
offense conviction.32 New crimes become more likely when reintegration into
civil society as productive citizens becomes more difficult.
The package of burdens, imposed by these laws and the private
actions they encourage, is extraordinary in at least two ways. First, no other
category of individuals who have completed their criminal sentence,
including any term of parole or supervised release, is subject to anything
remotely similar. Those who have completed their sentence for crimes like
murder or drug dealing need not usually worry about their registration
obligations in every state they enter, or locational bars on where they may go
or live, or a stamp on their driver license or passport. And this disparity gets
worse as recent criminal justice reforms intended to soften the much smaller
group of collateral consequences routinely imposed on former felons
typically exclude registrants from their grace. Recent examples include their
exclusion from reforms that allow other ex-felons to vote33 or to serve on a
jury,34 but there are others.35 Second, the American registry regime is an
international outlier. Even though many countries maintain sex-offense
registries available to law enforcement personnel, virtually none “permit[s]
the prevalent U.S. practice of proactive notification of sex-offense registry
29
Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 444 P.3d 116, 130 (Alaska 2019); see also Jill Levenson &
Leo P. Cotter, The Effect of Megan’s Law on Sex Offender Reintegration, 21 J. CONTEMP.
CRIM. JUST. 49, 61-63 (2005) (explaining how the ostracization of individuals on the sex
offender registry creates a host of bad outcomes, including job loss and threats or
harassment).
30
Jill Levenson & Richard Tewksbury, Collateral Damage: Family Members of Registered
Sex Offenders, 34 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 54, 57 (2009).
31
Brandon Stahl, Well-Meaning Family Takes in Sex Offender, Inciting Fear and Outrage,
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., (Oct. 1, 2016), https://www.startribune.com/well-meaningfamily-takes-in-sex-offender-inciting-fear-and-outrage/395526731/
[perma.cc/6V9XPS33].
32
See, e.g., To Seek Admission, DELANCEY STREET FOUND., (2020), http://www.delancey
streetfoundation.org/admission.php [perma.cc/SM29-9N2S] (stating that the organization
does not accept sex offenders because they need professional counseling).
33
FLA. STAT. § 98.0751 (2021).
34
For instance, the California Code of Civil Procedure excludes registrants, but not others
convicted of a felony, who have completed their term of parole or probation from jury
service. CAL. CIV. PROC. 203(a)(11), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/ codes_display
Section.xhtml?lawCode=CCP&sectionNum=203 [perma.cc/HTM5-YGG9].
35
See Catherine L. Carpenter, All Except for: Animus that Drives Exclusions in Criminal
Justice Reform, 50 SW. L. REV. 1, 9-17 (2020) (describing ways that states implemented
changes like sentence reclassification and increased eligibility for parole, among other
initiatives, to reform the criminal justice system).
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information to unlimited community organizations and the general public.”36
After reviewing the practices of other countries, as well as the social science
evidence, the American Law Institute approved a revision to the Model Penal
Code that eliminates entirely all publicly accessible websites listing “sex
offenders”, as well as any other forms of general public notification
concerning them, and prohibit or limit other collateral consequences currently
applied to them alone.
I here refer to those burdened by this registry regime as registrants,
although sometimes the burden in question is triggered directly by their prior
conviction rather than by their inclusion on the registry. In either case, finite
public resources that could be available for other crime control strategies are
devoted instead to imposing these unprecedented burdens on them. In 2008
the cost of complying with the then newly enacted federal standards for sex
offender registration laws was alone estimated at $59 million in California,
$30 million in Florida, and $39 million in Texas, equivalent to $74 million,
$37 million, and $49 million in today’s dollars.37 This is above and beyond
the baseline costs these states already incurred implementing the registry laws
they already had in effect. Both the public costs and the private burdens are
justified by the premise that registrants pose a distinctively greater threat of
sexual offending than do others: if prior offenders commit a large share of
sexual offenses, then this regulatory focus on their lives is a more effective
strategy for suppressing criminal sexual conduct than other programs
government might fund instead. A policy justification for this selective
imposition of serious burdens is necessary because the registry regime is a
constellation of civil regulations and not punishment. The registration regime
cannot be justified as punishment for the registrant’s sexual offense because
its rules do not meet constitutional requirements for imposing punishment, in
at least three ways.
First, registry regime rules are often applied to persons whose crimes
predate their adoption. This was the case in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2002),
in which the Supreme Court upheld this retroactive application of Alaska’s
newly adopted sex offender registry. But to reach this result Smith had to first
reject the claim that registration itself constituted punishment, because if it
36

A.L.I., Model Penal Code: Sexual Assault and Related Offenses, §213 (2021) (available
as Tentative Draft No. 5 at https://www.ali.org/projects/show/sexual-assault-and-relatedoffenses/#_status [perma.cc/68R8-QU8F]). See generally TERRY THOMAS, THE
REGISTRATION AND MONITORING OF SEX OFFENDERS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (2011).
37
What Will It Cost States to Comply With the Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act?, JUST. POL'Y INST. (2008), http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/08-08_FAC_
SORNACosts_JJ.pdf [perma.cc/8GXY-MLYY]. Current dollar values can be calculated
using the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI inflation calculator. CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S.
BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Nov.
11, 2021) [perma.cc/Y93N-QCA5]; see also Wang, supra note 6, at 705 (discussing how
states must consider financial costs in deciding whether to implement SORNA).
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was punishment its retroactive application would violate the ex post facto
clause. Alaska prevailed only because Smith held its registry was a civil
regulation, to which the ex post facto clause had long been held
inapplicable.38 Second, states and the federal government routinely impose
registry regime burdens on individuals because of conviction in another
jurisdiction, which they could not do if registration was punishment. If states
could punish for convictions in another state, they could also put new arrivals
back in prison if they believed the sentence they served in their former state
was too short. That is obviously not allowed. And finally, and most
fundamentally, punishment is necessarily imposed case by case, following
procedures that comply with constitutional Due Process requirements
necessary to justify its imposition on the particular individual. The legislature
may of course set the range of punishments available to a court to impose on
a person duly convicted, as part of each individual adjudication,39 but it
cannot, independently of any judicial process, impose punishment by statute
on specified individuals or groups it simply does not like, even if the dislike
is understandable.40
A state cannot evade the constitutional requirements for imposing
punishment by labeling the punishing regulation “civil”. Courts can look
beyond the label. The test is multi-factor, but the key is whether the
legislature in fact intended to punish, or, if not, whether the statutory scheme
is nonetheless “so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s]
intention to deem it ‘civil’”.41 A law’s failure to advance any permissible
public policy is one indicator of its punitive purpose.42 And so recently, two
federal courts of appeal held that Smith does not bar challenges to current
registry regime rules that now include burdens going beyond annual
registration, because the burdens’ cumulative impact constitutes punishment
that cannot be imposed retroactively.43 A number of state high courts have
reached the same result.44 Other courts, however, continue to rely on Smith

38

Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 400 (1798).
WAYNE LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING. & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, 1249–52 (5th ed. 2009).
40
E.g., U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 461 (1965).
41
Doe v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 700 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 55 (2017)
(quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)).
42
Id. at 704.
43
Does v. Wasden, 982 F.3d 784, 793 (9th Cir. 2020) (reversing trial court dismissal of
claims that Idaho registry was punitive and violated ex post facto clause); Snyder, 834 F.3d
at 706 (holding that provisions of the Michigan registry law imposed punishment in violation
of the ex post facto clause).
44
Doe v. State, 111 A.3d 1077, 1100 (N.H. 2015); Riley v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 98 A.3d
544, 555 (N.J. 2014); Starkey v. Okla. Dep't of Corr., 305 P.3d 1004, 1030 (Okla. 2013);
Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 44 (Ky. 2009); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 22–
23, 26 (Me. 2009).
39
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to reject challenges to the registry regime, finding them civil regulations not
limited by the ex post facto clause.45
The challengers’ focus on ex post facto claims requires them to argue
that the registry regime is punishment, because the Ex Post Facto Clause does
not otherwise apply. But a different way to frame their objection would
challenge its validity as a set of civil regulations. Success would then bar their
application prospectively as well as retroactively. When a civil regulation
targets and burdens just a small group of individuals, one ought to be able to
explain why that targeting furthers the public policy offered to explain its
adoption. This contrasts with the burden imposed by punishment following
conviction of a crime, which requires no such public policy rationale to
explain it. Although punishment may serve utilitarian considerations such as
general deterrence, the desire to make the convicted criminal suffer (within
the wide boundaries set by the Eighth Amendment’s bar on punishment that
is “cruel and unusual”) is entirely adequate as a constitutional matter. That is,
after all, what punishment means. But the state cannot target a small group
with civil regulations imposing punishing burdens just because it wants that
group’s members to suffer. As the Supreme Court explained years ago in
United States v. Moreno, if “‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything,
it must at the very least mean that a bare [legislative] desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest.”46 Targeting a particular group for special burdens requires a
rationale that is plausibly connected to a permissible policy purpose.47
The Moreno principle has not often been invoked. We are far more
accustomed to the usual rule that successful Equal Protection or substantive
45

E.g., Shaw v. Patton, 823 F.3d 556, 559-61, 577 (10th Cir. 2016); State v. Yeoman, 236
P.3d 1265, 1269 (Idaho 2010); Smith v. Commonwealth, 743 S.E.2d 146, 151 (Va. 2013);
Kammerer v. State, 322 P.3d 827, 839–40 (Wyo. 2014). In addition, one federal circuit
concluded that retroactive application of registration amendments to an offender did not
violate the ex post facto clause. Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d 105, 109–12 (2d Cir. 2014).
46
U.S. Dep’t. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973).
47
At the limit, a purportedly civil enactment targeting small groups of people for punishment
amounts to a forbidden Bill of Attainder. Some burdens the registry regime places on
registrants, such as exclusion from specified vocations, fall squarely within the understood
meaning of “punishment” for this purpose. See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,
474 (1977) (explaining that an impermissible legislative punishment includes a “legislative
enactment barring designated individuals or groups from participation in specified
employments or vocations . . . .”). The key question then becomes whether punishment was
the legislative purpose. Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 613 (1960). While the indicators
of animus combined with the refusal to take account of evidence that the registry regime
does not advance its stated purpose certainly suggests a punitive purpose, the Court has at
times applied a demanding standard of proof. Id. at 619 (stating that “unmistakable evidence
of punitive intent” is required to strike down a Congressional enactment). Especially as some
important burdens created by the registry regime, such as listing on the public website, may
not constitute punishment for Bill of Attainder purposes, claims based on the Moreno-Romer
line of cases described in the text may be more apt.
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Due Process challenges require a showing that the challenged rule burdens a
suspect class or a fundamental (or very important) constitutional right.
Moreno stands out because neither prerequisite was present there: the
decision struck down a regulation limiting hippies’ access to food stamps.
But Moreno is not a complete outlier. It has had echoes. City of Cleburne
later made clear that in applying the Moreno principle, courts may scrutinize
the government’s justifications to distinguish real explanations for the
challenged rule from pretextual ones. And so Cleburne struck down a local
zoning ordinance that required special permits for group homes for the
intellectually disabled, but not for fraternity houses or hospitals. Because the
city’s stated concerns about “crowded conditions” and the like could not
explain this differing treatment, the Court concluded the real reason was “an
irrational prejudice” against the intellectually disabled.48
Another label for “irrational prejudice” is “animus,” which is the
word the Court used in the third case in this line, in which it struck down a
state constitutional amendment that barred enactment of anti-discrimination
laws protecting gay men and lesbians. No one claimed the state was required
to enact such anti-discrimination laws, of course. Indeed, at the time of this
1996 decision, both private and governmental discrimination against
homosexuals was common and lawful. But because the “sheer breadth” of
the state’s constitutional bar on enacting anti-discrimination rules protecting
them could not be explained by any legitimate state interests, the Court
concluded the initiative was “inexplicable by anything but animus.”49 And
animus, at least with respect to civil regulations, is a forbidden legislative
purpose. The Moreno principle can thus be described as an Anti-Animus
principle, as one leading scholar has done.50
There’s no doubt, as Professor Carpenter has observed, that the AntiAnimus principle is undertheorized.51 But he makes a persuasive case that it
is nonetheless the best explanation not only for Moreno, Cleburne, and
Romer, but for also the Court’s later decision in U.S. v. Windsor.52 Windsor
held the federal government could not refuse to recognize a same-sex
marriage that New York, the couple’s home state, treated as valid.53 The
Court reached that result without holding sexual orientation to be a suspect
class, nor by relying on a claim that the federal rule unjustifiably burdened a
fundamental right to marry.54 Nor did it say the federal government may
48

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
50
Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV.
183, 207 (2014).
51
See id. at 204 (arguing that decisions like Windsor, Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer can be
understood as animus decisions but must be “more fully linked and theorized”).
52
570 U.S. 744, 765 (2013).
53
Id. at 749-53.
54
See id. at 769-75.
49
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never decline to recognize as valid for federal law purposes a marriage
concededly valid under the law of the spouses’ home state. It sometimes
can.55 The opinion’s avoidance of these more familiar doctrines has led some
critics to see it as a muddle.56 But as Carpenter explains,57 one thing all the
Windsor justices agreed upon was that a law driven by animus denies Equal
Protection to those it targets. Where they differed was on whether such
animus was in fact shown in Windsor. A majority concluded it was, relying
especially on Romer.58 We can also look to Romer along with Windsor for
guidance in identifying laws motivated by forbidden animus.
The laws in both Windsor and Romer had two features the Court
found important. The first was the imposition of “discriminations of an
unusual character” on an unpopular group.59 Such unusual tactics invite
suspicion.60 The unusual feature of Romer was its erecting a barrier to
legislative relief applicable only to one group. In Windsor it was the law’s
singular departure from the strong tradition of federal deference to state
policies in domestic matters. The second important feature is the broad scope
of the questioned law. Romer involved a state constitutional amendment that
worked a “sweeping and comprehensive . . . change in the legal status” of the
narrow group affected by it.61 The Court detailed dozens of state laws, local
ordinances, regulations, and executive actions revoked by the challenged
amendment.62 The law at issue in Windsor excised same-sex couples in one
fell-swoop from more than a thousand federal statutes and regulations that
made marital status relevant to the widely varying questions with which they
dealt.63 It becomes difficult to discern a common thread of public policy tying
together the broad swath of issues addressed by such sweeping enactments,
other than the intent to harm the small group it burdens. The registry regime
of course presents both features. The sweep of rules is breathtakingly broad,
and includes numerous burdens never before imposed on any other group of
people not currently under the supervision of the criminal justice system.
55
E.g., as Windsor itself observed, federal immigration law does not recognize marriages
“entered into for the purpose of procuring an alien’s admission [to the United States] as an
immigrant” despite the fact that the marriage is valid under state law, which does not
ordinarily consider the spouses’ reason for marrying relevant to recognizing their marriage’s
validity. Id.at 765; 8 U.S.C. §1186a(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2006).
56
See articles collected by Carpenter, supra note 51, at 190-91, n. 28. I freely borrow from
Professor Carpenter’s analysis of the anti-animus principle in these paragraphs.
57
Id. at 189.
58
Windsor, 570 U.S. at 768, 770–77.
59
Id. at 744, 768 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 633).
60
As Carpenter observes, an “extraordinary and unprecedented act requires an extraordinary
and unprecedented justification apart from the self-justifying desire to demean or injure a
stigmatized class of people.” Carpenter, supra note 51, at 217.
61
517 U.S. at 627.
62
Id. at 628.
63
570 U.S. at 765.
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Sweeping measures imposing an unusually broad array of burdens
exclusively on a small and unpopular group ought to raise an inference of
animus. Perhaps one could explain away the inference by reference to a
permissible public purpose. But explanation is needed. The point is to
distinguish laws enacted for a broad public purpose that justifies “the
incidental disadvantages they impose on certain persons,” and laws that have
“the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on
a single named group.”64 As Romer concludes, laws of the second kind “raise
the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity
toward the class of persons affected.”65 The more sweeping the burdens
imposed, and the narrower the targeted group, the more closely one should
examine the state’s asserted purpose for the law. In both Romer and Windsor
a single law burdened the targeted group across a broad range of contexts.
For registrants, the burden comes from the cumulative impact of many
laws—federal, state, and local—that together impose a startlingly broad set
of harms on their common target. There is no reason why the inference of
animus should be less in that case. To the contrary, it is strengthened by this
piling on, as new restrictions, new methods of public shaming, and new
harms are added year after year, jurisdiction after jurisdiction.
The history of these laws is also suggestive. As construction of the
registry regime began in the 1990’s, the narrative surrounding the adoption
of laws about sexual offending changed. It became personal, as Logan has
noted.66 Many of the new laws, both federal and state, were named after a
victim in one or another well-publicized case, typically involving a
particularly disturbing fact pattern—abduction and sexual abuse of a child by
a stranger (Megan’s Law, Jacob Wetterling Act, Adam Walsh Act are
perhaps the best-known examples).67 Though such cases are atypical (just 2%
of reported sexual offenses against children under twelve are committed by
strangers, much less strangers who abduct a child68) they nevertheless
64

Romer, 517 U.S. at 632, 635.
Id. at 634.
66
LOGAN, supra note 12, at 49.
67
Id.; see also Irina Fanarraga, What’s in a Name? An Empirical Analysis of Apostrophe
Laws, 21 CRIM. JUST. 1, 2 (2020) (explaining that sexual abuse laws are often named after
victims in highly publicized cases).
68
For minors twelve to seventeen years old, the comparable figure is 4%. These figures, and
all others referenced here, are derived from the online data extractor provided by National
Incident Based Reporting System maintained by National Center for Juvenile Justice,
available at https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezanibrsdv/asp/selection_vov.asp [perma.cc/
E9Y3-4CE8]. This system collects incidents known to local law enforcement agencies in
thirty-eight cooperating states and the District of Columbia and reported by them to the FBI.
Methods, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST. (2018), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ ojstatbb/ezanibrsdv/
asp/methods.asp [perma.cc/8UCP-K9AY]. The most recent available data available through
this tool on August 5, 2020, when the statistics provided here were obtained, was for
65
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became the understood context in any discussion of registry laws. So
strangers committing sexual assaults on children became the image of the
laws’ intended target even though hardly anyone affected by these laws had
ever committed such a crime. It is therefore not surprising that discussions of
the new registry regime laws took on a personal tone not seen in earlier
debates over sexual offense laws adopted in prior decades. Registrants were
now described as “beasts”, “monsters”, “animals”, and the “human
equivalent of toxic waste”.69 The mayor of one city explained it had adopted
residency restrictions for registrants that went beyond any imposed by state
law in order “to do anything we could to make sex offenders uncomfortable”,
and a key figure behind Florida’s adoption of harsh registry laws expressed
the same sentiment.70 In these examples the animus motivating the laws is
not hidden. The popular belief, adopted by legislators, is that all those reached
by the registry are threats to commit the horrific stranger attacks against

incidents occurring in 2016. The sexual offense data reported in this article were obtained by
using the tool to compile all incidents of “rape, sodomy, sexual assault with object, and
fondling” broken down by age and the relationship of victim and perpetrator. (These four are
the only sexual offense categories separately tabulated; other registerable offenses, such as
possession of sexualized pictures of minors or indecent exposure, are aggregated in other
categories such as “public order” offenses). The percentages are calculated excluding from
the denominator incidents in which the relationship was unknown. Id.
Murder victims are tabulated under murder, as the most serious charge, and are thus
omitted in the count of sexual offenses supplied by this tool even if there was also a sexual
offense. But this group’s omission from the sexual offense category is unlikely to affect the
overall percentages noted here because the total number of murders is very small. There were
211 murders of victims under twelve for the entire year, compared to 22,959 sexual offenses.
There were 174 murders of victims aged twelve to seventeen compared to 28,430 sexual
offenses. Easy Access to NIBRS Victims, 2016: Victims of Violence, Row Variable: Most
serious offense against victim, Column Variable: Age of victim, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST.
(2018), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezanibrsdv/asp/selection_vov.asp
[perma.cc/VMV3-MM6E].
Seven percent of the murders were known to have been committed by strangers, but
the victim-perpetrator relationship was unknown in 78 of the 174) cases. Id. showing Row
Variable: Most Serious Offense Against Victim, Column Variable: Victim Offender
Relationship, Selected for: victims aged 12 to 17 [perma.cc/8N6D-QQFB].
The victim was a male in 130 of the 174 murders, perhaps suggesting that many
were related to gang violence or drugs rather than sexual offending. For murder victims under
twelve years old, 109 of the 211 were males. Id. showing Row Variable: Age of Victim,
Column Variable Sex of Victim, Selected for: Murder [perma.cc/9AA8-3L5M].
69
LOGAN, supra note 12, at 95.
70
Dan Boyd, Two Sex Offender Bills Supported by Keller Contained Differences,
ALBUQUERQUE J., (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.abqjournal.com/1087241/two-sexoffender-bills-supported-by-keller-contained-differences.html
[perma.cc/7LVHBLVU]. The documentary film Untouchables includes interviews with the figure behind
Florida’s very harsh registry regime laws, who also suggests his goal was to make life for
Florida registrants so difficult that they would leave. UNTOUCHABLES (Blue Lawn
Productions 2016).
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children memorialized by the laws’ names, even if some had not yet been
caught at it, and so are malevolent people who deserve such treatment.71
There is animus when registrants are not considered as individuals but
as members of a group all damned by fundamental and probably permanent
character flaws making them likely to engage in evil conduct. The very label
“sex offender” applied to registrants encourages that understanding. People
are often disinclined to support treatment for those convicted of sex crimes
in the belief that it won’t work because they cannot be reformed.72 But
providing people with accurate information is not necessarily enough to
eliminate animus. For example, one study found potential jurors were twice
as likely to commit a felon labelled “sexually violent predator” to an
indefinite term of confinement, as compared to others with the identical
criminal records and risk assessment reports who were not so labeled. Their
harsher treatment of those labelled “sexual predators” was not explained by
a refusal to believe the risk assessment reports: they did believe them, as they
agreed that the labelled offenders were no more dangerous or likely to
reoffend than the unlabeled ones. What mattered was that for the labeled
offenders, jurors reported a greater desire to “get revenge” and to “make the
offender pay”.73
Such studies suggest the public is not very concerned about the
practical usefulness or efficacy of sexual offender crime control measures
because it believes these laws’ burdens fall only on evil people who deserve
them. The official sex offender label is easily seen as certifying their evil
status, thus justifying such attitudes. It’s thus not surprising that surveys find
most people support websites publicizing registrants’ “sexual offender”
status, restrictions on where registrants can live or go, and even their
castration, without regard to whether there is any evidence such policies
reduce sexual offending.74 But adopting laws because they burden people
seen as evil, without regard to whether they serve any public policy, is of
course the very definition of acting from animus.
The label “sex offender” is not a psychological diagnosis. It is a legal
classification triggered by a single conviction for any crime on a long list that
71

Kelly M. Socia & Andrew J. Harris, Evaluating Public Perceptions of The Risk Presented
by Registered Sex Offenders: Evidence of Crime Control Theater?, 22 PSYC. PUB. POL'Y. L.
375, 382 (2016).
72
Christina Mancini & Kristen Budd, Is the Public Convinced That “Nothing Works?”:
Predictors of Treatment Support for Sex Offenders Among Americans, 62 CRIME
DELINQUENCY 777, 780 (2016).
73
Nicholas Scurich, Jennifer Gongola & Daniel A. Krauss, The Biasing Effect of the
“Sexually Violent Predator” Label on Legal Decisions, 47 INT. J. L. PSYCHIATRY 109, 109
(2016).
74
Jill S. Levenson, Yolanda N. Brannon, Timothy Fortney & Juanita Baker, Public
Perceptions About Sex Offenders and Community Protection Policies, 7 ANAL. SOC. ISSUES
PUB. POL'Y 137, 150 (2007).
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ranges in both nature and seriousness. The evidence that animus toward
registrants lies behind the laws that burden them should require scrutiny of
whether the burdens in fact further the valid policy purpose offered to explain
them. That scrutiny requires a look behind the “sex offender” label, to ask
both if most so labeled in fact present a special risk of harm to others, and
whether the burdens selectively imposed on them actually suppress sexual
offending. Nor, as Carpenter points out,75 can that inquiry ignore advances in
our understanding of the burdened group. The forced expulsion of lepers to
separate colonies was once thought necessary to protect the public from a
disfiguring disease that evoked fear and disgust, but today that explanation
would not work. Given what we now know about the disease’s transmission
and treatment with antibiotics76 exiling lepers from civil society could today
be explained only by “irrational prejudice”—animus.
Registrants are today’s lepers. The intuition that they threaten grave
harm which the registry regime can prevent might have once been plausible,
but no longer. It must now yield to the facts established by several decades
of studies. Part II capsules that work.
II. STUDIES SHOW THAT MOST REGISTRANTS ARE UNLIKELY TO
REOFFEND, AND THAT THE REGISTRY REGIME CONTRIBUTES NOTHING
TO REDUCING RE-OFFENSE RISK ANYWAY
Three groups of studies establish the registry regime’s limited value
as a strategy for reducing sexual offending. One group focuses on two
particular burdens imposed by these laws: the public identification of
registrants as “sex offenders” through tools likes websites and mailings to
neighbors, and locational restrictions on where registrants may live or be
present. Despite the contrary intuitions of some public officials, the studies
find these measures contribute little or nothing to reducing the prevalence of
sexual offending.77 Their findings do not depend on any assumptions
75

Carpenter, supra note 51, at 225.
Natasha Frost, Quarantined for Life: The Tragic History of US Leprosy Colonies, HIST.
(Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.history.com/news/leprosy-colonies-us-quarantine [perma.cc/
5KHR-7VZT]; Leper colony, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/ index.php?title=
Leper_colony&oldid=1005596663 [perma.cc/W8XL-29UJ] (last visited Feb. 8, 2021) .
77
Amanda Y. Agan, Sex Offender Registries: Fear Without Function?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 207,
235 (2011); Jeff A. Bouffard & LaQuana N. Askew, Time-Series Analyses of the Impact of
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Law Implementation and Subsequent
Modifications on Rates of Sexual Offenses, 65 CRIME DELINQUENCY 1483, 1506 (2019);
SARAH NAPIER, CHRISTOPHER DOWLING, ANTHONY MORGAN & DANIEL TALBOT, AUSTL.
INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, TRENDS & ISSUES IN CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, NO 550, WHAT
IMPACT DO PUBLIC SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES HAVE ON COMMUNITY SAFETY 7 (2018);
Savage and Windsor, supra note 14, at 680; Kristen Zgoba, Bonita M. Veysey & Melissa
Dalessandro, An Analysis of the Effectiveness of Community Notification and Registration:
Do the Best Intentions Predict the Best Practices?, 27 JUST. Q. 667, 688 (2010).
76
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concerning the rate at which registrants commit a new sexual offense after
release. Most show simply that the offense rate, whatever it is, is no different
with these laws than without them. One study, by the Minnesota Department
of Corrections,78 adopted a different methodology. Minnesota had no
statewide law imposing locational residency restrictions on registrants; the
study’s purpose was to assess whether it should. It reviewed the records for
every one of the 224 individuals convicted of a sex offense who was released
from a Minnesota prison between 1990 and 2002 and then incarcerated again
by 2006 for a new sex offense. It examined the facts of each of the 224 reoffenses to determine how many might have been prevented had Minnesota
barred registrants from living within a mile of a school, park, playground,
daycare center, or “other location where children are known to congregate.”
The conclusion: there was not even a single case in which such locational
restrictions would have prevented the perpetrator’s contact with the juvenile
victim.79
A second group of studies tells us that even if laws targeting released
registrants did have some effect on their re-offense rates, they would not have
much effect of sexual offending generally. That’s because 95% or more of all
those arrested for sexual offenses are first offenders necessarily unaffected
by the registry regime rules (and this was the case before there was any
registry regime).80 The registry regime’s apparent premise—that a large share
of sexual offenses are committed by a small group who offend again after
completing a sentence for an earlier sexual conviction—is thus mistaken.81
78

MINN. DEP'T. OF CORR., RESIDENTIAL PROXIMITY & SEX OFFENSE RECIDIVISM IN
MINNESOTA 8 (2007).
79
Id. at 23–24.
80
Sarah W. Craun, Catherine A. Simmons & Kristen Reeves, Percentage of Named
Offenders on the Registry at the Time of the Assault: Reports From Sexual Assault Survivors,
17 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1374, 1379 (2011); Jeffrey C. Sandler, Naomi J. Freeman &
Kelly M. Socia, Does a Watched Pot Boil? A Time-Series Analysis of New York State’s Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Law, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y L. 284, 298 (2008).
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ANDRA TETEN THARP, KEY FINDINGS: RETHINKING SERIAL PERPETRATION 2 (2015). One
arena in which this debate has taken place is the college campus. An analysis of the two
largest longitudinal studies of college men’s sexual violence, based on interviews with them
upon arrival in college and during the four subsequent spring semesters, found that 10.8% of
the men reported behavior that met the FBI definition of rape, before or during their college
years, but that relatively few repeated the offense in a later year. Kevin M. Swartout, Mary
P. Koss, Jacquelyn W. White, Martie P. Thompson, Antonia Abbey & Alexandra L. Bellis,
Trajectory Analysis of the Campus Serial Rapist Assumption, 169 JAMA PEDIATRICS 1148,
1150-52 (2015). In other words, the campus problem is not so much that a few college men
are repeat sexual offenders, as that a disturbingly large percentage have offended at least
once. (It is also worth noting that women of college age who are not in college are more
likely than college women to suffer sexual assault). AYA GRUBER, THE FEMINIST WAR ON
CRIME: THE UNEXPECTED ROLE OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION IN MASS INCARCERATION 154–69
(2020); SORI SINOZICH & LYNN LANGTON, DEP'T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., RAPE

Vol. 7:1]

When Animus Matters

19

One can’t have much impact on the overall incidence of sexual offenses by
concentrating efforts on a group that accounts for less than 5% of them. The
law’s focus on registrants recalls the classic story of the fellow who tries to
help a drunk searching for his keys under a streetlamp. After a while he asks
the drunk if he’s sure this is where he lost them. “Oh no”, is the reply. “I lost
them in the park. But this where the light is.”82 If we want to make a real dent
in sexual offending rates, we must bring light to the park. Searching harder
under the streetlamp won’t help. And that is true no matter the overall rate of
sexual offending if most offenses are in the park.
And finally, a third group of studies helps explain why prior offenders
constitute such a small proportion of those arrested for sexual offenses: their
overall re-offense rates are far lower than the Supreme Court, as well as other
courts and public officials, have often assumed.83 There’s no doubt that some
registrants are more likely than other felons to commit a sexual offense, but
in fact most of them never do. This is true whether “re-offense” is defined as
a new arrest for a sexual offense, or a new conviction for one. A study by the
Criminal Justice Planning and Policy Division of the State of Connecticut
reports results typical of such state-conducted studies.84 The authors tracked
all 14,398 men released from Connecticut prisons in 2005, and broke out the
746 among them who had ever served a sentence for a sexual offense
(whether or not it was the offense that led to their most recent incarceration).
Twenty-seven of these 746 (3.6%) were arrested and charged with a new
sexual offense during the five-year follow-up period, of whom twenty (2.7%
of 746) were convicted of a new sexual offense.85 Of the 13,652 released
prisoners with no sexual offense history, 259 (1.9%)86 were arrested for a
sexual offense within five years of release, and 114 (0.8%)87 were convicted
of one.
Similar results were found in a federal study that followed for nine
years a sample of men released in 2004 from state prisons in thirty states
(accounting for 77% of all those released from state prisons).88 It found that
SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMIZATION AMONG COLLEGE-AGE FEMALES, 1995-2013 at 4
(2014).
82
Streetlight Effect, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/ index.php?title=Streetlight_
effect&oldid=970822782 [perma.cc/XFM9-YSWG] (last visited Aug. 20, 2020).
83
Ellman & Ellman, supra note 9, at 508.
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IVAN KUZYK, STATE OF CONN. OFF. OF POL'Y AND MGMT, RECIDIVISM AMONG SEX
OFFENDERS IN CONNECTICUT 4 (2012). https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/OPM/CJPPD
/CjResearch/RecidivismStudy/before-2020/SEXOFFENDERRECIDIViSM2012
FINALpdf.pdf.
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Id. at 29.
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(2005-14) 1 (2019).
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7.7% of those who had been incarcerated for rape or sexual assault were
arrested for new rape or sexual assault by the end of the nine year period, as
compared to the 3.4% rape and sexual assault arrest rate for those whose most
serious prior offense was robbery, a 2.5% rate for those whose most serious
prior offense was a property crime, and a 2.3% rate for all categories of
released prisoners combined, excluding any with a sexual offense convictions
before the new arrest.89 Other studies also find a sexual offense rate around
2% for released felons with no prior sexual offense history.90
So while, not surprisingly, those once convicted of a sexual offense
are on average more likely to be arrested for one than those convicted of only
nonsexual offenses, the difference is not as great as many expect. If more
than 90% of those burdened by the rules would not reoffend in any event,
policymakers ought to reconsider whether the funds spent on their
implementation might be better redirected to other strategies. Such
redirection is also suggested by the companion finding of the federal study:
released felons with no sexual offense history accounted for 84.4% of all the
rape or sexual assault arrests of released prisoners over the nine-year followup period it considered91 (because, of course, there were so many more of
them).92
It is also important to note a feature common to these and many other
re-offense rate studies: they survey new sexual offenses committed by
individuals released from prison. That means they almost certainly
overestimate the re-offense rate of all those convicted of sexual offense
89

Id. at 4, tbl.Table 2.
Rachel E. Kahn, Gina Ambroziak, R. Karl Hanson, David Thornton, Release from the Sex
Offender Label, 46 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV.. 861, 862 (2017).
91
ALPER & DUROSE, supra note 89 at 11 tbl. 9. There are, of course, many more released
felons with no conviction for a sexual offense than those with one.
92
Many arrested for a sexual offense will have had no prior convictions of any kind, much
less prison sentences for a sexual offense. There is thus no inconsistency between studies
that find 95% of all those arrested for a sexual offense have no prior sexual offense
conviction, and this study’s finding that 84% of released prisoners arrested for a sexual
offense had no prior sexual offense conviction. One may also note that the five-year sexual
offense re-arrest rate reported in the federal 30-state study was 5.9% (this figure is derived
by adding the percentages in years one through five shown in Table 5 of ALPER & DUROSE,
supra note 89, at 7), higher than the 3.6% rate found in the Connecticut study. A likely reason
is that the samples are different: The Connecticut study reports the rate across all persons
released from prison after any sexual offense, while the federal study is reporting on persons
released from prison who had convictions for rape or sexual assault. We can also compare
these data to those in a frequently cited study of adult males convicted of “violent” sexual
offenses and released in 1994 from a different sample of prisons in fifteen states. PATRICK
A. LANGAN, ERICA L. SCHMITT & MATTHEW R. DUROSE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., BUREAU OF
JUST. STAT., RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994 25–26 (2003).
The study found that after three years 5.3% had been arrested for a new sexual offense, which
compares to 4.4% after three years in the 30-state study. Id. at 26, n.51. Here again, the likely
explanation for the different rates is differences in the samples.
90
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because those released from prison are a higher-risk subset of all those
convicted of a registerable sex offense. Not everyone convicted of a sexual
offense is sent to prison. Some are sent to a county jail (because they are
given short sentences), or are placed on probation. But repeat offenders, or
those regarded by prosecutors or judges as higher risk, are more likely to be
sent to prison. This is true for felons generally, not just sexual offenders.93
That means those with prior offenses, as compared to first offenders, are overrepresented in samples of released prisoners. And we know repeat offenders
are more likely to offend again, than are those with only one offense. That
point is illustrated by the federal study itself, which reports that the smaller
group of first offenders (those with only one sexual offense) among those in
the study had a three-year sexual re-offense rate of 3.3%, much lower than
the 5.3% overall rate the study found. 94
The distinction between first offenders and repeat offenders is an
example of a difficulty that plagues many discussions of “sex offender” reoffense rates. The focus on an overall “sex offender” re-offense rate ignores
the heterogeneity of the population reached by the registry regime, an
oversight that also explains inattention to the characteristics of the particular
population for which a re-offense rate is reported in any given study. Their
implicit assumption is that the sample’s characteristics do not matter very
much because all those reached by the registry regime share a common
heightened re-offense risk. But they do not. Two easy examples of low-risk
registrant populations are female offenders and males whose only known
sexual offense is possession of illicit images of minors. Because there are so
few repeat offenders in both groups, it is a difficult challenge for risk
assessment experts to sample them in sufficient numbers to identify
distinctive traits necessary to develop statistically valid tools for predicting
those in either group most likely to offend again.95 Re-offense risk also varies
among men released after conviction for ordinary contact sexual offenses,
and widely used and easily administered actuarial tools can measure

93

Leon Neyfakh, Why Do So Many Ex-Cons End Up Back in Prison? Maybe They Don’t,
Says a Provocative New Study, SLATE (Oct. 19, 2015), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/
2015/10/why-do-so-many-prisoners-end-up-back-in-prison-a-new-study-says-maybe-theydont.html [perma.cc/FUA3-LKZH]; William Rhodes, Gerald Gaes, Jeremy Luallen, Ryan
Kling, Tom Rich & Michael Shively, Following Incarceration, Most Released Offenders
Never Return to Prison, 62 CRIME DELINQUENCY 1003, 1020–21 (2016).
94
LANGAN, SCHMITT, ERICA L., AND DUROSE, MATTHEW R., supra note 93 at 26.
95
Thomas H. Cohen, Predicting Sex Offender Recidivism: Using the Federal Post
Conviction Risk Assessment Instrument to Assess the Likelihood of Recidivism Among
Federal Sex Offenders: Predicting Sex Offender Recidivism, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
456, 472–74 (2018); Ethan Marshall, Holly A. Miller, Franca Cortoni & L. Maaike Helmus,
The Static-99R Is Not Valid For Women: Predictive Validity in 739 Females Who Have
Sexually Offended, 33 SEXUAL ABUSE 631, 632 (2020).
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individual risk.96 There is, in other words, no basis for treating all registrants
as a high risk when most are not and we can tell who is.
There’s also a second important source of variation in registrant reoffense risk that’s missed by studies that look only at overall rates for all
registrants: the re-offense risk for anyone convicted of a crime declines
rapidly over time at liberty, after release from custody, without reoffending.97 That includes those convicted of sexual offenses: The likelihood
they will be arrested for another sexual offense is approximately halved for
every five years at liberty without a new sexual offense arrest.98 It is not
possible to formulate a sensible policy concerning the post-release treatment
of sexual offenders, like other offenders, without taking this critical fact into
account.
So those convicted of sexual offenses vary considerably in the reoffense risk they present at the time of their release from custody, and then
again during the years that follow. These two phenomena—varying risk at
the time of release, and reduction in risk with time arrest-free in the
community—interact. The lower the initial risk posed by a group of
offenders, the sooner after release the risk approaches zero for those who
remain arrest-free. That pattern is shown by studies employing the most
widely used and validated actuarial tool measuring the re-offense risk for
most adult male sexual offenders, the Static-99R.99
The importance of these findings is illustrated by a recent California
study reporting the distribution of measured risk in a random sample of 371
adult male California registrants released from prison during 2006–2007.100
96

R. Karl Hanson, Andrew J. R. Harris, Leslie Helmus & David Thornton, High-Risk Sex
Offenders May Not Be High Risk Forever, 29 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 2792, 2793
(2014) [hereinafter Hanson et al., High Risk Sex Offenders]; R. Karl Hanson, Andrew J. R.
Harris, Elizabeth Letourneau & L. Maaike Helmus, Reductions in Risk Based on Time
Offense-Free in the Community: Once a Sexual Offender, Not Always a Sexual Offender, 24
PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y L. 48, 57 (2018) [hereinafter Hanson et al., Reductions in Risk]; Seung
Lee et. al, The Predictive Validity of Static-99R for Sexual Offenders in California: 2016
Update (2016), https://saratso.org/pdf/ThePredictiveValidity_of_Static_99R_ forSexualOff
enders_inCalifornia_2016v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5CH-HHG3].
97
Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of Widespread
Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327, 338–44 (2009); Megan C. Kurlychek,
Shawn D. Bushway & Robert Brame, Long-Term Crime Desistance and Recidivism
Patterns—Evidence from the Essex County Convicted Felon Study: Long-Term Crime
Desistance and Recidivism, 50 CRIMINOLOGY 71, 72 (2012).
98
David Thornton, R. Karl Hanson, Sharon M. Kelley & James C. Mundt, Estimating
Lifetime and Residual Risk for Individuals Who Remain Sexual Offense Free in the
Community: Practical Applications, 33 SEXUAL ABUSE 3, 18–19 (2019).
99
Hanson et al., Reductions in Risk, supra note 97, at 57; Hanson et al., High-Risk Sex
Offenders, supra note 97, at 2795.
100
Seung Lee et al., The Predictive Validity of Static-99R Over 10 Years for Sexual Offenders
in California: 2018 Update (2018), http://saratso.org/pdf/Lee_Hanson
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Based on their Static-99R scores, the study divided the released registrants
into five risk categories, from “Well Above Average” to “Very Low”. Only
33 of the 371 (8.8%) were in the “Well Above Average” category, with
another 74 (20%) classified above average in re-offense risk. More than 70%
of registrants were in the three lowest categories, “Average,” “Below
Average,” and “Very Low.” The “Average” group reaches a 2% re-offense
risk before their tenth year at liberty. That means that by then, only 2% of
those still offense-free after ten years will be arrested for a sexual offense in
the future. 98% will not. Their 2% re-offense rate is much lower than the
3.4% of robbers in the Connecticut study arrested for rape or sexual assault
within nine years of release, and less than the 2.3% rate for all released
offenders with no prior sexual offense convictions. The Below Average
group reaches this 2% benchmark before the fifth year after their release,
while the lowest risk group is at 2% lifetime risk at the time of their release.
Even if we look only at the riskiest 10% of these California registrants
who had been sentenced to prison, we find that about two-thirds are never
again arrested for a sexual offense. More importantly, by the fifteenth year
after their release we pretty much know who the law-abiding two-thirds are,
because nearly all those who offend again already have.101 This is important
because the burdens imposed by registry regimes typically continue for life
for higher risk registrants, and certainly past fifteen years, despite the decline
in re-offense risk over time at liberty without re-offending. And while most
registry regimes separate registrants into risk levels, their sorting criteria are
usually inconsistent with the applicable social science learning, subjecting
registrants to the registry regime for periods unjustified by their risk levels.102
These studies explain the scholarly consensus that emerges from the
dozens of peer-reviewed articles published over the last two decades: the
registry regime is not sensible policy because so many registrants do not
present the heightened offense risk assumed by many policymakers, because
registrants account for less than 5% of known offenses, and because the
regime’s common strategies, public identification of registrants as “sex
offenders” and restrictions on where they may live and go, are ineffective in
achieving their goal of reducing sexual offending, and may even risk
increasing it.103 At the same time, there’s evidence that broader-focused
_Fullmer_Neeley_Ramos_2018_The_Predictive_Validity_of_S_.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Z24C-V5TF].
101
Hanson et al., Reductions in Risk, supra note 97, at 57.
102
Kristin Zgoba, Michael Miner, Jill Levenson, Raymond Knight, Elizabeth Letourneau &
David Thornton, The Adam Walsh Act: An Examination of Sex Offender Risk Classification
Systems, 28 SEXUAL ABUSE J. RSCH. TREATMENT 722, 728 (2016).
103
Factors that reduce the likelihood of reoffending include employment, Megan Denver,
Garima Siwach & Shawn D. Bushway, A New Look at the Employment and Recidivism
Relationship Through the Lens of a Criminal Background Check: Criminal Background
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preventative and rehabilitative strategies would be more effective,104 and
these preventative strategies could be expanded if funds spent on the registry
were spent instead on them.
It has thus seemed clear for some time that the burdens the registry
regime imposes on those reached by it do not serve the policy purposes
offered to justify them, while there are other little-used strategies that may.
Yet legislatures continue to enact measures imposing and increasing these
burdens. Their adoption arises from the same kind of animus that motivated

Checks and Recidivism, 55 CRIMINOLOGY 174, 196 (2017), as well as housing and social and
family support, Grant Duwe, Can Circles of Support and Accountability (CoSA) Significantly
Reduce Sexual Recidivism? Results from a Randomized Controlled Trial in Minnesota, 14 J.
EXP. CRIMINOLOGY 463,481 (2018). The registry regime makes them all more difficult to
achieve. It is thus not surprising that some studies find the registry regime actually increases
rather than reduces re-offending. J.J. Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Laws Affect Criminal Behavior?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 161, 164–
65 (2011).
104
Primary prevention strategies that keep people from offending in the first place are
potentially more effective than focusing exclusively on reoffending because, as we have
seen, re-offending accounts for only small proportion of all reported offenses. Though
challenging to develop and implement, there is evidence that some do work. Sarah DeGue,
Linda Anne Valle, Melissa K. Holt, Greta M. Massetti, Jennifer L. Matjasko & Andra Teten
Tharp, A Systematic Review of Primary Prevention Strategies for Sexual Violence
Perpetration, 19 AGGRESSION AND VIOLENT BEHAV. 346, 352–53 (2014); Charlene Y. Senn,
Misha Eliasziw, Paula C. Barata, Wilfreda E. Thurston, Ian R. Newby-Clark, H. Lorraine
Radtke & Karen L. Hobden, Efficacy of a Sexual Assault Resistance Program for University
Women, 372 N. ENGL. J. MED. 2326, 2332–33 (2015); Klaus M. Beier, Umut C. Oezdemir,
Eliza Schlinzig, Anna Groll, Elena Hupp & Tobias Hellenschmidt, “Just Dreaming of
Them”: The Berlin Project for Primary Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse by Juveniles
(PPJ), 52 CHILD ABUSE NEGL. 1, 2 (2016); Gabriela N. Mujal, Meghan E. Taylor, Jessica L.
Fry, Tatiana H. Gochez-Kerr & Nancy L. Weaver, A Systematic Review of Bystander
Interventions for the Prevention of Sexual Violence, TRAUMA VIOLENCE ABUSE 381, 392–
93 (2019). See Linda A. Anderson & Susan C. Whiston, Sexual Assault Education Programs:
A Meta-Analytic Examination of Their Effectiveness, 29 PSYCH. WOMEN Q. 374, 381 (2005)
(stating that college sexual assault education programs had significant average effect sizes
on rape attitudes, rape-related attitudes, rape knowledge, behavioral intent, and incidence of
sexual assault). And there are also promising prevention strategies to prevent re-offending
that do not depend on the registry. See, e.g., R. Karl Hanson, Guy Bourgon, Leslie Helmus
& Shannon Hodgson, The Principles of Effective Correctional Treatment Also Apply To
Sexual Offenders: A Meta-Analysis, 36 CRIM. JUSTICE BEHAV. 865, 881(2009); Duwe, supra
note 104, at 481; Lisa L. Sample, Brooke N. Cooley & Tusty ten Bensel, Beyond Circles of
Support: “Fearless”—An Open Peer-to-Peer Mutual Support Group for Sex Offense
Registrants and Their Family Members, 62 INT. J. OFFENDER THERAPY COMPAR.
CRIMINOLOGY 4257, 4261–62 (2018). See also Theresa A. Gannon, Mark E. Olver, Jaimee
S. Mallion & Mark James, Does Specialized Psychological Treatment for Offending Reduce
Recidivism? A Meta-Analysis Examining Staff and Program Variables as Predictors of
Treatment Effectiveness, 73 CLIN. PSYCH. REV. 101752, 5–7 (2019) (finding that treatment
was associated with offense-specific and general recidivism reductions and that programs
with consistent input from a qualified psychologist had best results).
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the laws targeting hippies and gay people—animus that led the Court, in
Moreno, Romer, and Windsor, to find the laws constitutionally defective.
III. LOW REPORTING RATES FOR SEXUAL CRIMES PROBABLY
STRENGTHEN THE CONCLUSION THAT THE REGISTRY REGIME
CONTRIBUTES NOTHING TO PREVENTING SEXUAL OFFENDING
Victims of crimes do not always report them. Getting an accurate
count of unreported crimes is obviously difficult. The most common method
relies on the National Crime Victimization Survey conducted by the
Department of Justice.105 This survey of a nationally representative sample
of households asks individuals aged twelve or over about the details of each
victimization they experienced over the prior six months, including whether
they reported it to the police.106 The percentage of victimizations that
respondents say they reported is calculated for each crime category. This is
the reporting rate most commonly referenced. The most recent available
report, tabulating the results of the 2018 survey, found that only 42.6% of all
violent crimes were reported to the police,107 essentially unchanged from the
levels found in the 2016 and 2017 surveys.108 The reporting rate for rape and
sexual assault bounces around more, almost certainly because of the smaller
sample size for this narrower crime category.109 It was 23% in 2016, then
40% in 2017, and then back to 25% in 2018.110
While it’s thus difficult to get a firm figure for the proportion of sexual
offenses victims never report, it seems certain that it’s substantial. Nor do we
have a firm idea of why victims do not report, although there are many
plausible possibilities. These include embarrassment, fear of retaliation, or
fear that one’s account won’t be believed. Surveys that ask victims why they
do not report sometimes yield surprising results: one common response in

105
A study jointly supported by the National Academy of Sciences and the Bureau of Justice
Statistics provides a comprehensive overview of the sources of data on sexual crimes. See
generally CANDACE KRUTTSCHNITT, WILLIAM D KALSBEEK & CAROL C. HOUSE,
ESTIMATING THE INCIDENCE OF RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT (Nat'l Rsch. Council ed. 2014).
106
Eligible household members are interviewed every six months for three and a half years,
initially in person and later in person or by phone. Crimes that occur with such frequency
that a victim cannot distinguish details of individual incidents are called series crimes; the
victim is asked about details of the most recent incident. Id. at 59-63.
107
RACHEL E. MORGAN & BARBARA OUDEKERK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST.
STAT., CRIM. VICTIMIZATION, 2018 8 tbl. 5 (2019) [hereinafter MORGAN 2018].
108
RACHEL E. MORGAN & JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST.
STAT., CRIM. VICTIMIZATION, 2017, 7 tbl. 6 (2018) [hereinafter MORGAN 2017].
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E.g., Sharon L. Lohr, How Many Sexual Assaults are Reported to Police?, https://www.
sharonlohr.com/blog/2018/9/24/how-many-sexual-assaults-are-reported-to-police [perma.
cc/QLF4-R9UB] (last visited Aug. 20, 2020).
110
MORGAN 2018, supra note 108, at 1; MORGAN 2017, supra note 109, at 8.
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some surveys is a version of “I didn’t think it was important enough.”111 The
bottom line is that we know many victims of sexual crimes do not report
them, but we are less certain of the precise percentage, or of the relative
importance of the various possible reasons why they do not report.
Does the reporting rate matter? Appreciating that sexual crimes occur
more often than indicated by arrest statistics may heighten our desire to
combat them, or pursue reforms that might encourage victims to report, on
the plausible assumption that more reporting would lead to more arrests and
thus more deterrence. But it does not say much about how to deal with those
who are arrested. It’s hard to see, for example, why the sentence imposed on
an individual convicted of a sexual crime should be affected by sexual crime
reporting rates rather than by the facts of that particular defendant’s crime.
The question we address here is whether reporting rates matter in
evaluating either the constitutionality or the advisability of the registry
regime. At least one federal appeals court has suggested they might. 112 The
court considered whether requiring those convicted of most sexual crimes to
wear location monitoring ankle bracelets the rest of their life was an
unreasonable search barred by the Fourth Amendment. The court thought a
111

In a 2015 survey of college students conducted for the Association of American
Universities, 59% of the “victims of nonconsensual sexual contact by physical force or
incapacitation” who had not reported the incident, offered this explanation. DAVID CANTOR,
HYUNSHIK LEE, BONNIE FISHER, CAROL BRUCE, SUSAN CHIBNALL, GAIL THOMAS &
REANNE TOWNSEND, REPORT ON THE AAU CAMPUS CLIMATE SURVEY ON SEXUAL ASSAULT
AND SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 110 tbl. 6–1 (2015), https://www.aau.edu/key-issues/aauclimate-survey-sexual-assault-and-sexual-misconduct-2015?id=16525
[perma.cc/HN6FLQBE]. An equivalent explanation (“not important enough to report”) was the common
reason given for not reporting sexual assaults in a victimization survey of the Canadian
population conducted 16 years earlier. That was equally true, however, for most other
categories of crime considered in that survey. SANDRA BESSERER & CATHERINE TRAINOR,
CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN CANADA, 1999 11–12 (2000), https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/
n1/en/pub/85-002-x/85-002-x2000010-eng.pdf?st=3vyWcQ4h [perma.cc/3UC4-V7YY].
The National Crime Victimization Survey also asks women to identify the reason
for not reporting a rape or sexual assault. “Fear of reprisal” was the “most important reason”
while “[p]olice would not [or could not] do anything to help was the reason identified by 8%
of respondents. Only 7% of respondents said the assault was “[n]ot important enough” to
report, although 23% said they did not report because it was a “[p]ersonal matter.” MICHAEL
PLANTY, LYNN LANGTON, CHRISTOPHER KREBS & MARCUS BERZOFSKY, FEMALE VICTIMS
OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, 1994-2010, at 7 tbl. 9 (2013), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/
pub/pdf/fvsv9410.pdf [perma.cc/5FH9-ZTRW]. Varying methodologies, samples, and
response rates undoubtedly explain the varying counts. E.g., SHARON L. LOHR, MEASURING
CRIME 97–111 (2019) (“Many of the differences among estimates of sexual assault from
surveys can be explained by the methods used to collect the data and measure sexual
assault”).
112
See, e.g., Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 934 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Although non-sex offenders
had a higher rearrest rate (68%) than sex offenders and only 3% of child molesters were
rearrested for a child-molestation offense, these numbers don’t take account of the very high
rate of underreporting of sex offenses.”). The opinion was written by Posner.
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low reporting rate for sexual offenses supported its conclusion that the search
was reasonable, because it meant the sexual re-offending was more common
than official crime statistics indicated, and so also then was the threat to
public safety the rule meant to address. The greater threat was thought to add
justification for rules burdening registrants subject to them.113
A recent article, The Dark Figure of Sexual Recidivism, goes
further.114 It argues the social science studies often cited in legal challenges
to the registry regime are flawed because they employ official crime statistics
that necessarily miss unreported offenses. The article has been cited in
litigation in response to parties citing those social science studies.115 Dark
Figure focuses on constructing a mathematical model meant to estimate the
magnitude of the “missed” offenses.116 The article concludes the proportion
of sexual offenses not reported is much higher than the Crime Victimization
surveys suggest. It argues that the scholarly consensus about re-offense rates
is therefore wrong.117 While the authors “take no position” on the “propriety”
of the registration regime,118 they conclude it is “untenable” for researchers
to rely on “official crime statistics” and inappropriate for policymakers to
employ well-validated actuarial risk assessment instruments that predict only
“observed” re-offending.119
But what facts about crime rates should policymakers, judges, and
scholars rely upon if not the known facts about reported sexual crimes? The
authors’ implicit answer is that they should instead rely on the estimates of
unknown facts offered by their model. That is a bad idea for two reasons. The
first is that their model is flawed, so there is no reason to credit their
heightened estimates of the number of unreported sexual offenses. That point
is well-made in critiques by others120 which I briefly capsule below. My
primary focus, however, is on a threshold question to which neither judges

113

Id. at 933–34.
Scurich & John, supra note 11.
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E.g., Reply Brief For Intervenor Office of Attorney General at 4–6, Commonwealth v.
Torsilieri, 232 A.3d 567 (2020) (No. 2148 EDA 2019) (citing Scurich and John’s article, The
Dark Figure of Sexual Recidivism, to challenge the assumptions that recidivism rates among
sex offenders are low).
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Scurich & John, supra note 11, at 164–66.
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Id. at 172.
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Id. at 160.
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Id. at 172.
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Tamara Rice Lave, J.J. Prescott & Grady Bridges, The Problem with Assumptions:
Revisiting “The Dark Figure of Sexual Recidivism,” 39 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 279 (2020). A
second piece making many of the same observations was written concurrently although
published earlier; it is consistent with the analysis of Lave, Prescott, and Bridges. Brian R.
Abbott, Illuminating the Dark Figure of Sexual Recidivism, 38 BEHAV. SCI. LAW 543, 546
(2020).
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nor Dark Figure gives attention: does the sexual offense reporting rate even
matter in any legal or policy analysis of the registry regime? I conclude it
does not matter, which is the second reason to ignore the Dark Figure
estimates. We now consider these two reasons in turn.
A. Flaws in the Dark Figure Model Make Its Estimates Misleading
The recent critique by Lave, Prescott and Bridges identifies several
critical defects in the Dark Figure model. The model assumes the likelihood
of a registrant re-offending does not change over the years following release
from custody121 despite ample data showing it does (because the probability
of reoffending declines for each arrest-free year following release from
custody122). It assumes victims who know the perpetrator was previously
convicted of a sexual crime are no more likely to report the crime against
them,123 an implausible assumption for reasons I explore below. It does not
take account of the fact that those convicted of a sexual offense vary in their
propensity to re-offend, even though it purports to.124 And fourth, the model’s
estimates of the number of missed offenses are based on data from a skewed
sample of re-offense studies, some of which are misread.125
The model also assumes the likelihood of the police knowing of a
crime is unaffected by whether the perpetrator is a repeat or one-time
offender.126 But it’s more plausible to assume that those who commit multiple
sexual crimes are more likely to be caught and convicted, at least once, than
are one-time offenders, and that once police identify the perpetrator of one
sex crime, the chance rises that they will identify others he or she committed.
In that case the missed offenses Dark Figure attempts to estimate consist
disproportionately of those committed by one-time offenders whose
apprehension is less important, for preventing future offenses, than is
catching repeat offenders (although of course one-time offenders also deserve
punishment for their crime).
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Scurich & John, supra note 11, at 167; Lave, Prescott & Bridges, supra note 121, at 11.
E.g., Hanson et al., Reductions in Risk, supra note 97.
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Scurich & John, supra note 11 at 167; Lave, Prescott & Bridges, supra note 121 at 14–
17.
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Lave, Prescott & Bridges, supra note 121 at 17–20.
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The study looks primarily at a skewed sample of older studies with small sample sizes
while ignoring more recent ones with larger sample sizes. Id. at 286. Additionally, the study
assumes the reported re-offense rates use only convictions and must therefore be adjusted
upward—because convictions do not always follow from arrest for actual offenses, when in
fact, some studies measured re-offending by counting arrests instead. Id. at 6.
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Scurich & John, supra note 11, at 171.
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B. The Overall Sex Crime Reporting Rate Does Not Affect the Legal or Policy
Analysis of the Registry Regime
1. Reporting rates matter only if they are different for different groups
The standard estimates of unreported offenses provided by the
National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) cannot distinguish reporting
rates for sexual offenses committed by registrants from reporting rates for
sexual offenses committed by others because victims are not asked whether
the perpetrator of the offense they identify in the survey was a registrant. Nor
would respondents necessarily know the answer if asked. The estimates of
unreported offenses provided by the Dark Figure model reflect that same
limitation. The model estimates only overall reporting rates; it cannot and
does not estimate reporting rates for offenses committed by registrants
separately from those committed by others. Indeed, the paper never considers
whether the reporting rate for crimes committed by registrants might differ
from the reporting rate for crimes committed by others; its analysis silently
assumes they are the same. But that same-reporting-rate assumption renders
their model irrelevant to the legal or policy analysis of the registry regime.
That is because the regime’s premise is that registrants pose a much greater
threat of sexual offending than does everyone else, thus justifying our focus
on them. But if reporting rates for crimes committed by registrants and nonregistrants are the same, then we need look only at reported offenses to test
that premise. Thus, the same-reporting-rate assumption underlying the Dark
Figure model renders its results irrelevant to questions addressed by the
social science studies it purports to cast doubt on.
For example, consider the studies showing that about 95% of all
reported sexual offenses are committed by those with no prior sexual crime
conviction. If we assume reporting and conviction rates for offenses
committed by those with prior sex crime convictions are no different than for
offenses committed by those without them, simple arithmetic tells us that we
would get the same 95% result if we could somehow count unreported
offenses too. Or consider the studies that show that re-offense rates for
registrants are lower than were historically assumed, such as the federal study
of released state prisoners described above.127 Counting unreported offenses
could have no effect on the finding that those with no sexual crime history
commit 84% of all rapes and sexual assaults committed by released prisoners,
or that released robbers commit such crimes at nearly half the rate of released
rapists. Including unreported crimes in the count would raise the total
number, but the proportion accounted for by each group remains the same if
the reporting rate for the groups are the same.
127

See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
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Finally, consider the various studies that assess whether public
websites listing registrants, or rules controlling where they may live or go,
reduce the rate of sexual offending. Because controlled experimentation is
not possible, these studies must rely on naturally arising differences. This
typically means comparing outcomes before and after the imposition of a law,
or comparing outcomes between otherwise similar jurisdictions with
different laws.128 What’s compared is the rate of known sexual offenses with
and without the registry regime rule under study. Assume the study finds no
difference in the rate of reported offenses with and without the rule. Would it
matter if the study also included estimates of unreported offenses in its
calculation of rates? Not if the proportion of all sexual offenses that are
reported is the same for both groups. The offense rates would still be the same
with and without the rule. And that’s true whether the reporting rate is 75%,
50%, or 25%, so long as it is the same for both.
The key point is that any evaluation of the efficacy of the registry
regime necessarily depends upon the relative crime rates between groups, not
their absolute level of overall offending. That’s not to say the absolute level
of offending across all groups does not matter for any purpose. Of course it
does. The more often a bad thing happens, the more reason we have to combat
it. But the question here is whether the registry regime is an effective combat
strategy, and the underreporting phenomenon cannot affect our assessment of
its efficacy unless the reporting rate differs depending upon registry status.
2. Registrant offense rates must be assessed by comparing them to the
offense rates of other apt population groups, not to zero
To consider whether a sexual offense rate is high or low one must
have a benchmark to which to compare it, because nothing is high or low
except in comparison to something else. That’s true whether one’s talking
about blood pressure, interest rates, batting averages, or crime rates. Is an air
temperature of fifty degrees high or low? The answer depends on whether
the benchmark is the average temperature in January or July. Of course, in
casual conversation people often say something is high or low without
explicitly identifying a benchmark, but the benchmark is usually implied.
Someone who says “public school teacher salaries are low” doesn’t mean
they’re low because brain surgeons earn more, but because they are lower
than other occupations the speaker believes comparable. Any debate over
teacher salaries necessarily becomes a debate about the apt comparison
group.
The silent assumption that often lies behind claims that the sexual
offense rate of registrants is high is that the appropriate benchmark against
128
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which to compare their offense rate is zero. But zero cannot be an appropriate
benchmark because there is no apt comparison group of non-registrants with
a zero sexual offense rate. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently
concluded when offered the analysis in Dark Figure, “the relevant question
should not be whether convicted sexual offenders are committing unreported
sexual crimes, but rather whether sexual offenders commit more sexual
crimes than other groups not subject to similar registration laws.”129 That is
a key insight. Registrant sexual offense rates must be compared to the sexual
offense rate of an apt comparison group that is similarly situated but not
subjected to the registry regime.
The comparison group employed by leading scholars in this area is
released felons with no history of sexual offending (to whom the registry
regime is not applied).130 Useful comparisons must also take account of the
fact that registrants are not a homogenous group. Some sexual offenses have
lower re-offense rates than others, and within offense categories, individual
re-offense likelihood varies in measurable ways.131 Good empirical studies
allow one to separate registrants into groups based on re-offense risk. Nor is
the composition of these risk groups static. As we have seen, the re-offense
risk of registrants, like that of other released felons, declines rapidly over time
at liberty without having re-offended. That means the offense risk of most
registrants (all but those who start out with a higher risk than most other
registrants) will fall below the benchmark comparison rate within five or ten
years after release.132 Even if some registry regime rules were effective, there
is no explanation for applying them to subgroups of registrants who pose no
more risk than does the comparison group not subject to those rules.
In sum, both legal and policy analysis of the registry regime must
compare the sexual offense rates of particular groups of registrants to the rate
of an apt comparison group of non-registrants, not to zero. The proportion of
sexual offenses that are reported can have no effect on such comparisons
unless the proportions of offenses that are reported differ among the groups
being compared. While Dark Figure assumes they do not (thus rendering its
analysis irrelevant) we now consider the possibility that they do.
3. The rate of unreported sexual offenses may vary with the
characteristics of the offense
Because unreported crimes will not lead to arrest, comparing the
arrest rates of two groups is misleading if offenses by one group are reported
less often than the other’s. If registrants’ offenses were reported at a lower
129
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rate than those committed by others, then registrant arrest rates would
understate their offense risk, relative to the risk posed by others. On the other
hand, if registrants’ offenses are reported at a higher rate than offenses
committed by others, then comparing the two groups’ arrest rates would
overstate the registrants’ relative sexual offense risk. The problem is
potentially worse if one compares sexual crime convictions rather than
arrests. The additional steps necessary to get from arrest to conviction can
also differ across comparison groups. If arrested registrants are less likely to
be convicted than are others arrested for a sexual offense, then comparing the
two groups’ sexual offense convictions will understate registrants’ relative
risk (assuming no difference between groups in the percentage of arrestees
who in fact committed the charged crime). But if arrested registrants are more
likely to be convicted than are others arrested, such comparisons overstate
their relative risk. They might be convicted at higher rates even though they
do not actually offend at higher rates, because their offenses more often lead
to conviction. The Dark Figure model attempts to estimate actual offense
rates by correcting both arrest and conviction rates to include not only
offenses committed but unreported, but also reported offenses that really
happened but did not lead to conviction. But as previously noted, its estimates
are for sexual offenses overall, not sexual offenses broken down by offender
groups.
The model thus implicitly assumes (as Lave, Prescott and Bridges
observe) that a perpetrator’s previous conviction for a sexual offense has no
effect on either the likelihood that a victim will report the offense, or that the
perpetrator will be arrested, prosecuted, or convicted for it.133 It assumes the
gap between offenses actually committed and offenses resulting in an arrest
and conviction is the same for both groups. Is this same-gap assumption
correct? Because there is no data on the number of unreported offenses
broken down by whether the perpetrator has a prior offense, we cannot
answer that question definitively. But we can make an informed guess.
Shortly after Dark Figure was released this author commented that
reasonable inferences about police conduct suggest registrant offenses are
more likely to lead to arrest than offenses committed by others.134 And Lave,
Prescott, and Bridges have since explained more fully why the same-gap
assumption is almost certainly wrong.135
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A victim’s decision to report a sexual offense cannot be affected by
the perpetrator’s prior conviction unless the victim knows if the perpetrator
has a prior conviction. Where perpetrator and victim are strangers, the victim
is unlikely to know. But strangers accounted for only 15.5% of sexual assaults
on adult women known to law enforcement authorities in 2016.136 Most
perpetrators are known to their victims because they are current or previous
intimate partners, or acquaintances, friends, co-workers, or family
members.137 Victims won’t always know about the prior conviction of these
groups either, but sometimes they will. There’s reason to think such
knowledge makes reporting more likely. Two common explanations victims
give for not reporting are fear they won’t be believed or fear they will be
blamed themselves for the assault.138 Knowledge that the perpetrator has a
prior sexual offense conviction may reduce those fears.
Consider next reported offenses that lead to no arrest because no
perpetrator is identified. That’s obviously more likely when the perpetrator is
a stranger whose identification depends upon police investigation. The police
effort to identify a perpetrator will surely include looking at lists of local
sexual offenders taken from the registry or from police records. Either source
will include fingerprints, so that where the perpetrator left a print, those with
prior sexual offenses will be identified. Indeed, the increasingly routine
collection of DNA samples from those convicted of a crime139 may allow the
police to quickly identify and thus pursue perpetrators in any current case in
which DNA evidence is available, again increasing the likelihood that those
with prior convictions, but not first offenders, are eventually prosecuted. And
finally, successful prosecutions are also more likely where the defendant has
a prior sex crime conviction.140 Knowing that, prosecutors are of course more
likely to prosecute these cases in the first place.
In sum, it seems reasonable to infer that a) victims are more likely to
report sexual offenses committed by perpetrators whom they know have a
prior sexual offense conviction; b) police are more likely to follow up on
reports by victims who identify the perpetrator as someone with a prior; c)
police are more likely to identify and thus arrest perpetrators with prior sexual
offenses; d) prosecutors are more likely to file charges and win convictions
in cases in which the alleged perpetrator has a prior sexual offense conviction.
136
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I know of no data that would allow one to test these inferences, but they
certainly seem more plausible than the same-gap assumption silently made
by the Dark Figure model. And if that implausible same-gap assumption is
indeed wrong, then registrants’ sexual offense rates, relative to the rate of
comparison groups, are probably lower than the studies report.
CONCLUSION
The registry regime regulates the lives of nearly a million Americans
who are not in custody, not on parole or post-release supervision of any kind,
who have committed no crimes since completing whatever sentence was once
imposed on them for a crime that may have been committed decades earlier.
The collection of rules, federal, state, and local, combine to make it difficult
or impossible for registrants to find housing or employment, to travel, to
maintain family connections, or to rejoin and contribute to their community.
The burdens often extend to the registrants’ spouses and children. The
regime’s debilitating rules are typically imposed for decades, and sometimes
for life, without regard to anything a registrant may do to redeem himself.
No remotely similar system of civic exclusion applies to people once
convicted of any other crime, be it murder, or arson, or violent assault, or
drug-dealing. Nor has any other western democracy adopted any similar
regime. None of them employ the central feature of the American registry
system, a publicly accessible database, searchable by name or locale,
allowing anyone to obtain, for any reason or no reason, personal information
about those with sexual offense convictions.
Nor does it seem the registry regime can contribute to the broader
battle against sexual abuse represented by today’s #MeToo movement. A key
goal of that movement is recognition that sexual offending is pervasive
because it is encouraged by an enabling culture. The solution it seeks requires
broader cultural shifts.141 By contrast, the message of the registry regime, as
Eric Janus points out, is that the problem is not us but “them,” a small group
of deviant men who must be identified, contained, isolated, and ostracized
because they have uncontrolled urges that may erupt at any time and account
for most sexual offending.142 Shifting the onus from us to them means we can
return to business as usual once we take care of them. The animus toward
141
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them, born of understandable if nonrational fears, may also be a convenient
strategy for those resistant to the cultural changes the #MeToo movement
seeks. It enlists the disgust and anger that is easily aroused against individuals
associated with a small group of particularly heinous offenses to divert
attention from discussion of the larger cultural changes that would affect
many more of us. So, registry reform is not inconsistent with the goals of the
#MeToo movement. Indeed, shifting resources from the ineffective registry
regime to sexual abuse preventative strategies that have been found
promising, would advance the movement’s goals.
Registry rules were born of understandable fears, the laws
establishing them named for the victims of terrible crimes. But laws that
focus such harms on a discrete and widely despised group must be justified
by facts, not fears. We have seen that justifying facts are hard to find. Why
then does the registry regime persist? As Eula Biss observed, in her study of
those who refuse vaccinations, our “fears are dear to us. When we encounter
information that contradicts our beliefs, we tend to doubt the information, not
ourselves.”143 But as understandable as that is as a matter of human
psychology, the law must demand more than fears before inflicting deep
harms on the group that elicits them.
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